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ABSTRACT 
A large interdisciplinary consortium of engineers, social scientists and policy analysts have 
developed three low carbon, more electric transition pathways for the United Kingdom (UK): 
described as ‘Market Rules’ (MR), ‘Central Co-ordination’ (CC) and ‘Thousand Flowers’ (TF) 
respectively. It adapts an approach based on earlier work on understanding transitions, using a 
multi-level perspective with landscape, regime and niche levels, and its application to the 
development of ‘socio-technical scenarios’. These pathways to 2050 focus on the power sector, 
including the potential for increasing use of low carbon electricity for heating and transport. 
Part 1 describes studies of historical energy and infrastructure transitions are described that 
help the understanding of the dynamics and timing of past transitions. The role of large-scale 
and small-scale ‘actors’ in the electricity sector and the methods used to develop the pathways 
are then described. In Part 2 associated technologies are evaluated in order to determine the 
choices that need to be made by UK energy policymakers and stakeholders. There all three 
pathways have also been appraised in terms of their environmental performance using 
complementary life-cycle assessment and footprinting methods. Lessons can clearly be drawn 
for other industrialised nations attempting to decarbonise their electricity generation systems, 
although local circumstances will determine the country- and region-specific options. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1    Background: The Energy Sector and Climate Change Challenge 
Human development is underpinned by energy sources of various kinds that heat, power and 
transport its citizens in their everyday life (Smil, 2017). But, while energy supplies and 
technologies underscore continued economic development, they also give rise to unwanted 
side-effects. Arguably the principal environmental burden emanating from the energy sector is 
the prospect of global warming due to an enhanced greenhouse effect induced by fossil fuel 
burning (Hammond, 2000; IPCC, 2013, 2019). Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the principal 
‘greenhouse gas’ (GHG) having an atmospheric residence time of about 100 years (Hammond, 
2000). This mainly arises from the combustion of fossil fuels [such as coal, natural gas and oil 
(petroleum)] in power stations and transport, as well as for heating in buildings and industrial 
processes. Changes in atmospheric concentrations of GHGs affect the energy balance of the 
global climate system. Human activities have led to dramatic increases since 1950 in 
atmospheric CO2; concentrations have risen from 330 ppm in 1975 (IPCC, 2013) to about 408 
ppm in 2018 (WMO, 2019). The recent (2013) scientific assessment by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) asserts that it is ‘extremely likely’ that humans are the 
dominant influence on the observed global warming since the mid-20th Century. The 2015 
Paris Agreement on climate change aims to keep temperatures “well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels” (Ares & Hirst, 2015). However, bottom-up national pledges received in 
connection with the Paris Conference for GHG mitigation efforts are expected to result in a 
warming of around 2.7oC, even if fully implemented (Ares & Hirst, 2015). So the world still 
faces a significant test of reducing GHG emissions further in order to bring global warming 
into line with the aspirations in the Paris Agreement. Indeed, the IPCC in their recent ‘special 
report’ on the implications of keeping temperatures down to 1.5°C (IPCC, 2019) argued that 
humanity has just 12 years to respond to the climate change challenge (i.e., by about 2030 
rather than 2050 presently incorporated in international agreements), if it wishes to keep global 
warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Thus, it needs to instigate appropriate actions in 
the very near future. 
The evolution of modern industrialised society has been interwoven with discoveries of sources 
and uses of energy (Hammond & Pearson, 2017), especially the exploitation of fossil fuel 
resource stocks, the assembly of energy infrastructures, and the development of end-use 
technologies and practices. With its coal reserves, ports and engineering skills, Britain lay at 
the heart of the first industrial revolution (Allen, 2009; Wrigley, 2010). Nowadays, while 
energy supplies underpin continued economic development, this fossil fuel dependence 
exposes the UK to major risks: supply and resource insecurities; increasing costs of energy 
supply; and damage to the quality and longer-term viability of the biosphere. The British 
Government therefore introduced a bold, legally binding aim of reducing the nation’s ‘targeted 
GHG emissions’ overall by 80% by 2050 in comparison to a 1990 baseline (DECC, 2011) in 
their 2008 Climate Change Act (Climate Change Act, 2008). This initiative led the way globally, 
and subsequent pathways for achieving such levels of GHG savings are now known as “deep 
decarbonisation” in much of the industrialised world (see, for example, Spencer et al., 2017). 
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The 2°C global warming target agreed at the Paris Agreement (Ares & Hirst, 2015) is broadly 
consistent with the 2050 UK GHG emissions target. It led the British Government’s 
independent Committee on Climate Change (CCC), established under the 2008 Climate 
Change Act, to advocate deep cuts in power sector operational emissions through the 2020s 
(CCC, 2015), with UK electricity generation being largely decarbonised by 2030-2040. In 
recommending the Fifth ‘Carbon Budget’ for the period 2028-2032, they proposed a 57% fall 
in GHG emissions overall below 1990 levels by 2032. Achieving these CO2 reduction targets 
will require a challenging transition in Britain’s systems for producing, delivering and using 
energy that is not only low carbon, but also secure and affordable; thus resolving three 
components of the so-called energy policy ‘trilemma’ (Hammond & Pearson, 2017). Such 
GHG reductions will necessitate a rapid transition towards an energy system that delivers high 
quality energy services through low-carbon technologies and processes, that are also secure 
and at competitive prices.  
In 2018 the UK Government asked the CCC to give it advice on the possible tightening of the 
2050 target in light of the Paris Agreement (Ares and Hirst, 2015). Its subsequent report 
advocated a new emissions target for the UK: net-zero GHGs by 2050, i.e., balancing emissions 
with CO2 removal. The CCC argued that this target is “achievable with known technologies, 
alongside improvements in people’s lives, and within the expected economic cost that 
Parliament accepted when it legislated the existing 2050 target for an 80% reduction from 
1990” (CCC, 2019). They also advised that the steepest reductions in GHG emissions must 
occur before 2030. The CCC suggested that the readily available options include low-carbon 
electricity [from nuclear power and renewable energy sources {bioenergy, solar photovoltaic 
(PV) arrays, and wind turbines}, which would need to quadruple by 2050], energy efficient 
buildings with low-carbon heating (required throughout the UK’s building stock, both new and 
existing structures), electric vehicles (which they view as the only proven light vehicle option 
by about 2035), developing carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology and low-carbon 
hydrogen (which the CCC regard as necessities not just options). In addition, the CCC propose 
phasing-out potent fluorinated gases, increasing tree planting, adopting measures to reduce 
GHG emissions on farms, and stopping biodegradable waste going to landfill. Such policies 
should together deliver tangible GHG emissions reductions, whereas the CCC viewed current 
UK climate change policy as being insufficient to meet even the existing 2050 targets (CCC, 
2019), i.e., an 80% reduction against the 1990 baseline. The Climate Change Act was 
subsequently amended by the UK Government in June 2019 in order to target a reduction of 
all GHG emissions to net zero by 2050. 
Electricity demand in the UK as a share of overall energy consumption is likely to rise over the 
longer-term, because it is readily controllable at the point of use and its production can be 
decarbonised via nuclear and renewable energy technologies (RET). The evolution of 
electricity generation systems since the time of Thomas Edison (1847–1931) has been based 
around the concept of employing large, centralised power stations. Thus, until recently, the 
bulk of electricity in Britain was generated by large thermal power plants that were connected 
to a high-voltage transmission grid, and then distributed to end-users via regional low-voltage 
distribution networks. Such a centralised model has delivered economies of scale and 
reliability, but there are significant drawbacks. It is represented schematically in Fig. 1 
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(Hammond, 2000), where the role of the electricity network is illustrated. This power 
generation was resourced from some 39% natural gas, 33% RET (wind turbines, solar 
photovoltaic cells, hydropower and bioenergy), 18% nuclear power, and 5% coal in 2018 the 
most recent full year data available at the time of writing in the annual Digest of United 
Kingdom Energy Statistics [DUKES] (BEIS, 2019)). Consequently, the UK Electricity Supply 
Industry (ESI) is still nearly 50% dependent on primary fossil fuels, i.e., natural gas and coal. 
Heat is lost or energy ‘wasted’ at each stage of system from extraction of primary resources to 
end-uses that meet demand (Hammond, 2000). Much of the electricity grid was constructed in 
the 1950s and 1960s. It is therefore heavily reinforced in former coal-mining areas, and is 
nearing the end of its design life. It restricts the power flow from Scotland to England 
(2.2GWe), and via the interconnectors (in the form of high-voltage undersea cables) to France, 
Northern Ireland and the Netherlands. The grid will therefore require not only renewal, but also 
reconfiguration of both hardware and software in order to accommodate the introduction of 
greater levels of distributed generation in the future within the home or on a community- scale. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Simplified representation of the UK energy system. [Source: Hammond, 2000.] 
 
1.2     The Transitions Approach 
Dutch researchers have pioneered research on transitions in socio-technical systems, which has 
expanded, diversified and deepened during the last decade, under the broad heading of 
‘sustainability transitions’ (Markard et al. 2012; Kohler et al. 2019). It has influenced their 
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national policy on promoting energy system transitions (Kemp et al., 2007; Kern and Smith, 
2008; Verbong and Geels, 2010; MEA, 2005), and stimulated historical case studies (Kemp et 
al., 2011), including applications to the Dutch electricity system (Verbong and Geels, 2007; 
Kwakkel and Yücel, 2014). Other analyses have examined transitions from sailing ships to 
steam ships (Geels, 2002); from horse-drawn to automobile transport systems (Geels, 2005); 
from cesspools to sewer systems (Geels, 2006); and biogas development in Denmark (Geels 
and Raven, 2006). It has been used to examine the dynamic interaction of technological and 
social factors at different levels (Elzen et al., 2004; Geels, 2005), and has generated significant 
international policy and research interest (Kemp, 1994; Geels, 2002; Voß et al., 2009; Foxon 
et al., 2010; Markard et al., 2012; Foxon, 2013; Hammond and Pearson, 2013; Hammond and 
Pearson, 2017; Chilvers et al., 2017). This analytical approach is typically coupled with a multi-
level perspective (MLP) for analysing socio-technical transitions, based on co-development at 
and between three levels (Kemp, 1994; Geels, 2002): niche innovations, socio-technical 
regimes, and macro-landscape pressures [see, for example, Fig. 2 (Foxon et al., 2010)]. The 
landscape represents the broader political, social and cultural values and institutions that form 
the deep structural relationships of a society and only change slowly (Chilvers et al., 2017). 
The socio-technical regime reflects the prevailing set of routines or practices used by ‘actors’: 
those involved with the design, implementation operation and use of a particular technological 
system or network (see, for example, Rip and Kemp, 1998; de Bruijn and Herder, 2009). Whilst 
the existing regime is thought of as generating incremental innovation, radical innovations are 
generated in niches (Kemp, 1994; Geels, 2002). The latter are ‘protected’ spaces that are at 
least partially insulated from normal market selection in the regime. Niches provide places for 
learning processes to occur, and space to build up the social networks that support innovations, 
such as supply chains and user-producer relationships. 
 
Fig. 2.  Possible transition pathways and the factors that influence them.  
                   [Source: The Transition Pathways Consortium (Foxon et al., 2010).] 
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The transitions approach has been used as a basis for developing ‘transition management’. This 
is a process of governance seeking to steer or modulate the dynamics of transitions through 
interactive, iterative processes between networks of stakeholders. It involves creating shared 
visions and goals, mobilizing change through transition experiments, as well as the evaluation 
of the relative success of these experiments (Kemp and Rotmans, 2005; Loorbach, 2007; 
Loorbach et al., 2015). Transition management is thus a form of participatory policy-making 
based on complex systems thinking. However, the transitions theory or socio-technical 
approach is not without its critics (Geels and Schot, 2007; Geels, 2010; Geels, 2011; Grubler, 
2012; Barton et al., 2018). Although Shove and Walker (2007) recognised the value of 
‘sustainable transitions management’ for stimulating change towards predefined beneficial 
goals, they argued that analyses based on the MLP typically have an over-simplified view of 
the social realm, being rooted in ‘innovation studies’ (see, for example, Smith et al., 2010). In 
a response, Rotmans and Kemp (2008) noted that it is an approach that has been used in the 
Netherlands in particular (see also Kemp et al., 2007; Verbong and Geels, 2007; Kern and 
Smith, 2008; Verbong and Geels, 2010; Kwakkel and Yücel, 2014; MEA, 2015) to aid the 
achievement of better futures. Transitions management helps secure incremental system 
improvements and innovations within the planning framework; often in the face of complexity 
and uncertainty. Indeed, Grubler (2012) drew on ‘real world’, historical energy transitions in 
order to highlight the long duration of transitions (many decades) and their slow rates of 
change, the importance of energy end-uses as drivers of change, and the distinctive patterns 
needed for the scale-up of technological solutions. But even Grubler (2012) provided 
cautionary tales. He suggested that low carbon transitions require persistence and continuity of 
policies, their alignment (e.g., regarding fossil fuel subsidies), and balanced innovation 
portfolios (e.g., public sector R&D investment and niche market incentives). Geels and Schot 
(2007) developed a more detailed typology of transition pathways, focused on refinements to 
the MLP, in response to critiques and insights in the academic literature (Shove and Walker, 
2007; Rotmans and Kemp, 2008; Smith, 2009; Meadowcroft, 2009) that were followed-up by 
Geels (2010, 2011, 2019). Although many successful transition paths reflect a sequence of 
events (Geels and Schot, 2007), they are not automatic or deterministic. Many of the pathways 
may not, in reality, turn out to have a pure format (Geels and Schot, 2007; Geels, 2010; Geels, 
2011), and shifts between them can result in those exhibiting mixed characteristics (Geels et 
al., 2016).   
An initial theoretical analysis of past and possible future decarbonisation pathways for the UK 
(Shackley and Green, 2005) showed the potential for the application of the transitions approach 
in Britain. Shackley and Green (2005) identified a number of key socio-technical factors that 
would influence future pathways in terms of policy drivers for change. A number of studies 
have applied the MLP for a comparative analysis of low carbon electricity transitions in, for 
example, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK (Laes et al., 2014; Geels et al., 2016). These 
countries were selected as exemplars of the deployment of RET (Laes et al., 2014), of a 
transition management framework (MEA, 2005; Kemp et al., 2007; Verbong and Geels, 2007; 
Kern and Smith, 2008), and of legislative commitment to climate change mitigation (Climate 
Change Act, 2008) respectively. They identified best governance practices, e.g., creating 
communities of interest, target setting to link long-term strategies with shorter-term (energy or 
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carbon) budgets, and the adoption of policy incentives. Geels et al. (2016) built on the revised 
typology of Geels and Schot (2007) in their comparison of Germany and the UK electricity 
transitions. They observed that the dominant transition pathway in Germany was based largely 
on technological substitution enacted by new entrants who have led the deployment of small-
scale RET (Laes et al., 2014). In contrast, incumbent ‘actors’ (such as the Big Six electricity 
utilities) led the deployment of large-scale RET in the UK; mainly onshore, and more recently 
offshore, wind farms. However, the British policy incentives for RET have been significantly 
weakened over the last decade (Barton et al., 2018), although Geels et al. (2016) believe it is 
likely that the UK will still meet its current renewable electricity target of 30% by 2020 under 
the European Union agreement. Market conditions have led to a share of electricity generation 
from RET being 33% in 2018, according to DUKES (BEIS, 2019). Likewise, the take-up of 
new nuclear power stations and CCS facilities coupled to fossil-fuelled power stations and 
industrial process plants have been significantly delayed in comparison with what was initially 
envisaged in the early 2010s (Cooper and Hammond, 2018). The delay by the UK government 
in publishing an update to its origin Carbon Plan (DECC, 2011) may reflect the challenges in 
ensuring that the UK remains on track for further emissions reductions in the late 2020s and 
early 2030s (Barton et al., 2018). This plan subsequently became The Clean Growth Strategy 
(HM Government, 2017), and links a low carbon transition to an updated national industrial 
strategy (Busch et al., 2018; Cooper and Hammond, 2018). 
 
1.3      The Issues Considered 
A large interdisciplinary consortium of engineers, social scientists and policy analysts have 
developed three low carbon transition pathways for a more electric future in the UK out to 
2050: termed ‘Market Rules’ (MR), ‘Central Co-ordination’ (CC) and ‘Thousand Flowers’ 
(TF) respectively. [This large consortium of nine university partners was originally funded via 
the strategic partnership between e.on UK (the electricity generator) and the UK Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) to study the role of electricity within the 
context of ‘Transition Pathways to a Low Carbon Economy’ (2008-12), and then renewed with 
funding solely from the EPSRC under the title ‘Realising Transition Pathways: Whole Systems 
Analysis for a UK More Electric Low Carbon Energy Future’ (RTP) (2012-16).] The present 
research examined the most recent version 2.1 (v2.1) of the pathway narratives (Hammond and 
Pearson, 2017; Chilvers et al., 2017; Barton et al., 2018): driven by the market (MR), central 
government intervention (CC), and civil society (TF) (e.g., local communities and non-
governmental organisations [NGOs]) initiatives: see Table 1. This emphasis on ‘governance’ 
as a prime mover of market development is a novel feature in terms of energy futures research 
in Britain (Foxon et al., 2010; Hammond and Pearson, 2013; Chilvers et al., 2017). [The TF 
pathway’s name was loosely inspired by the late Chairman Mao Zedong's 1957 invitation to 
Communist Party cadres in China to criticise the political system then in place within the 
country: “Let a hundred flowers blossom” {often misquoted as the bottom-up injunction to 
“Let a thousand flowers bloom” (Chilvers et al., 2017)}.] This transition pathways research 
has focused on the choices and actions needed to get there from here, and on the analysis of 
the pathways’ technical, socio-economic and environmental implications. It built on an 
approach based on earlier work on understanding transitions, as discussed in the previous 
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section. These ‘socio-technical scenarios’ or transition pathways focus on power generation, 
including the potential for increasing use of low-carbon electricity for heating and transport 
The extent to which choices need to be made by UK energy policymakers and stakeholders 
between the large-scale and small-scale actors, pathways and associated technologies are 
discussed. 
Table 1. Key characteristics of the UK transition pathways. 
 
Source: Chilver et al., 2017; adapted from Foxon (2013). 
 
The present research programme sought to understand and contribute to potential future 
transitions of UK energy systems and to enhance policy thinking and decision-making. Here 
(in Part 1) studies of historical energy and infrastructure transitions - which inform how the 
broad, long-term sweep of change that arises out of interactions between actors or actor 
networks, institutions and infrastructures - have helped understand the dynamics and timing of 
 
Pathway 
Designation 
 
Market Rules 
(MR) 
 
Central Co-ordination 
(CC) 
 
Thousand Flowers 
(TF) 
 
 
Governance 
logic 
 
 
Market  
 
Government  
 
Civil society  
 
 
Critical 
technologies 
 
Fossil fuel (coal and gas) 
CCS; Nuclear power; 
Offshore wind 
 
Fossil fuel (coal and gas) 
CCS;  Nuclear power;  
Offshore wind 
 
Solar photovoltaic (PV) 
arrays; Onshore & 
offshore wind; renewable 
Combined Heat & Power 
(CHP) 
 
 
Important 
trends 
 
Limited interference in 
market arrangements; 
high level policy targets 
and high carbon price. 
 
Central government 
commission tranches of 
low-carbon generation 
from big companies to 
reduce risk of low carbon 
investment. 
 
Local, bottom-up diverse 
solutions led by local 
communities and NGOs, 
greater community 
ownership and more 
engagement of end-user. 
 
Electricity 
demand 
 
Increase demand for 
heating and transport. 
Overall demand in 2050 
(512 TWh) much greater 
than today. 
 
Increase demand for 
heating and transport, but 
reduced through energy 
efficiency. Overall 
demand in 2050  
(410 TWh) slightly 
higher than today. 
 
Overall demand in 2050 
(310 TWh) lower than 
today. Higher rate of 
energy efficiency 
improvements and more 
aware consumers. 
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transitions (Chilvers et al., 2017; Pearson, 2018). The multi-level perspective (MLP) – 
encompassing, as noted above, macro-landscape pressures, socio-technical regimes and niche 
innovations - has been used as the basis for developing the socio-technical scenarios (as 
depicted in Fig. 2), which can be employed to explore the potential future development of 
socio-technical systems through interactions between ongoing processes at the three levels 
(Elzen et al., 2004; Foxon, 2013; Hammond and Pearson, 2013; Hammond and Pearson, 2017).  
In Part 2 all three pathways (MR, CC and TF) are evaluated in terms of their environmental 
performance using complementary life cycle assessment (LCA) and footprinting methods. The 
energy analysis and environmental LCAs reported by Hammond et al. (2013) and Hammond 
and O’Grady (2014; 2017a; 2017b), evaluated v1.1 and v2.1 of the pathways respectively. 
Environmental footprint analysis (EFA) are also employed to estimate the environmental and 
resource burdens associated with UK power generation based on historic data and the three 
transition pathways (Hammond et al., 2019). 
 
2. The UK Energy Sector – The Role of ‘Actors’ Large and Small 
The ‘governance’ of energy systems involves choices made by different actors within the 
sector, such as national and local policy-makers, large firms and new entrants, financial 
investors and end-users, that give rise to changes to the system (Smith, 2009). These actors 
have a range of individual and social goals, including the supply, provision and use of energy 
services at reasonable costs, maintaining security of supply, and contributing to wider social 
and environmental aims, which may often be conflicting – but are sometimes harmonious - in 
any particular decision process. Institutional arrangements frame the way that these conflicts 
are resolved, or synergies reinforced, and so strongly influence the governance of energy 
systems. Furthermore, they interact with present and expected future changes in technologies, 
such changes create new opportunities and challenge existing arrangements (having new 
information about the risks of climate change), and with new institutional arrangements and 
governance processes that create incentives for development of, and investment in, particular 
technologies and their uses. 
The current UK energy regime for meeting lighting, heating and power-related services may 
be characterized as a centralised system [see DUKES (BEIS, 2019)]. Electricity is generated 
centrally, largely from fossil fuels (now mainly natural gas), nuclear power and a growing, set 
of renewable resources (i.e., RET). Natural gas is extracted from the North Sea or imported via 
pipelines or as liquefied natural gas (LNG). It is delivered to homes and businesses through 
the transmission and distribution networks, before being used to provide end-use services, 
together with distributed energy resources (DER), i.e., small-scale units of local generation 
connected to the grid at the distribution level, and the building infrastructure. Natural gas is 
also delivered through a transmission and distribution network, and used to provide heating 
and cooking services with the aid of end-use technologies and the buildings infrastructure. The 
markets for the provision of electricity and gas were liberalized in the late 1980s and 1990s in 
order to facilitate competition between electricity generators, and between companies 
supplying electricity and gas to homes and businesses, overseen by a regulator Ofgem, with the 
aim of reducing the costs of generating and supplying energy to users. The strategic importance 
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of energy for enabling wellbeing and economic activity means that the system is the subject of 
intense policy activity, focussed on ensuring continuing, affordable supplies, and meeting other 
social and environmental objectives, including climate change and global heating. 
  
Key processes at the landscape level (see Fig. 2) influencing and ‘driving’ the energy regime 
include: (a) public awareness of climate change and willingness to accept and undertake 
changes in response; (b) government commitments to meet national and international targets 
for emissions reductions and promotion of low carbon energy sources; (c) ideological 
commitments to liberalized energy markets; (d) concerns over security of primary energy 
supplies (including external factors leading to high oil and gas prices); and (e) factors which 
could lead to physical disruption of external supplies (war, terrorism, foreign governments 
limiting supply, etc.). The dominant processes are focused on the energy policy trilemma: 
government commitment to national and international targets for moving to a low carbon 
energy system, concerns over security of supply, and issues of affordability, competitiveness, 
and fuel poverty. The UK has signed up to, and was one of the drivers of, the European energy 
and climate policy back in 2007. This set targets for 2020 of a 20% reduction in European CO2 
emissions, a 20% increase in energy efficiency, and 20% of final energy to come from RET. 
Such landscape-level commitments contained in both national and European energy and 
climate policy targets need to be translated into direct pressures on the energy regime through 
enhanced policies and measures.  
 
Another driver of UK energy policy at the landscape level is concerns over security of primary 
energy supplies. A variety of factors anticipated between now and 2030 have led to a perceived 
generation ‘gap’ and concerns about availability of primary energy sources to enable this 
supply deficit to be filled, whilst achieving carbon reduction targets. This policy arena has been 
strongly driven by lobbying from actors, including large incumbent utility companies within 
the existing regime seeking to maintain the current centralized generation system and their role 
in it. An interesting potential institutional innovation was a proposal to sell energy services 
rather than units of energy, which was encouraged under the British Government’s Carbon 
Emission Reduction Target (CERT) scheme that operated over 2008-2013. This required 
energy suppliers to stimulate take-up of low carbon and energy efficient measures by their 
customers. This type of scheme could potentially lead over the long-term to significant changes 
in business strategies for large industry players, particularly if they face challenges from new 
entrepreneurial energy service companies. How these different pressures affect business 
strategies depends partly on the way in which firms perceive the various commercial risks 
within the energy system. A survey of a range of stakeholders identified the major risks 
associated with a rapidly changing UK electricity sector as being: reliance on insecure sources 
of primary fuels for electricity generation; lack of investment in new infrastructure; 
decommissioning of nuclear plant leading to reduced capacity; severe weather conditions 
arising from climate change; and maintenance of capacity margins (Hammond and Waldron, 
2008).  
The potential exists for a move away from a largely centralised electricity systems towards 
more decentralised ones (Barton et al., 2018). Whilst many different alternatives exist within 
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each of these routes, they are significantly different from each other, particularly in terms of 
infrastructures, institutions, and patterns of behaviour. These can be characterised as follows:-   
(1) Centralised generation systems: Concerns over security of supply, and doubts about the 
potential to scale up local decentralized technologies, may reinforce strategies of large energy 
companies to maintain portfolios of large-scale technologies, including natural gas and nuclear 
power plants. Hence, investment focuses on these technologies, alongside scale-up of offshore 
wind, and reinforcement and enhancement of existing transmission infrastructure. The way that 
targets for emissions reductions and renewable energy sourcing are institutionalized could 
allow investment by UK companies overseas to count towards UK targets, and so UK domestic 
targets would become less stringent, delaying early action on decentralized options, and 
reducing the overall pace of change. This investment in centralised technologies, and 
associated infrastructure, might crowd out the potential for large investments in decentralized 
options. 
(2) Decentralized or distributed generation systems: Technical, social and economic concerns 
relating to the main centralized options, including carbon capture and storage (CCS), nuclear 
power and offshore wind, may lead to greater, renewed interest in decentralised options. Strong 
local leadership and sharing of knowledge between entrepreneurial local authorities could be 
reinforced by advocacy coalitions of small-scale actors: technology developers, installers and 
new energy service companies (ESCo) promoting decentralised generation (DG). 
Infrastructure investment might focus on enhancing capacity of distribution networks to 
actively manage two-way power flows and on investment in the built infrastructure to utilise 
DER and capture natural energy flows, e.g., through passive solar design and natural 
ventilation. 
 
3.    Past, Present and Prospective Energy Transitions 
Studies of historical energy and infrastructure transitions have helped understand the dynamics 
and timing of transitions (see, for example, Wilson and Grubler, 2011; Sovacool and Geels, 
2016; Pearson, 2018). Policy makers tend to have little institutional memory of what has 
worked or has not worked in terms of energy sector interventions, because job changes are used 
to enable UK civil servants to gain experience and avoid accumulating positional or 
departmental loyalty, and because ministers often serve for short periods (Chilvers et al., 2017): 
from 2008-2015 of the four UK Secretaries of State for Energy and Climate Change, one 
served for less than two years and another for just over one year. Historical analyses/stories of 
past transitions therefore help them (and other stakeholders) to understand how and why 
transitions have previously succeeded or failed. They also indicate how long they can take to 
implement and the reasons why. However, Pearson (2018) recently noted the growing policy 
focus on ‘low-carbon transitions’, which address the threat of climate change by seeking 
transitions away from GHG-emitting fossil fuels, towards low-carbon renewable and/or 
nuclear power. He explored three areas in which further historical analysis could be especially 
valuable: (i) research into the duration and speed of past energy system transitions and the 
insights to be gained from their analysis; (ii) path dependence, lock-in and the strategies, 
responses and destabilisation of incumbent energy actors and institutions; and (iii) theoretical 
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and empirical approaches to ‘sustainability transitions’ and innovation. While most attention 
has been paid to transition successes, belated attention is now being paid to transition failures 
and resistance to change by incumbent firms, as well as their fuels, technologies and institutions 
(Chilvers et al., 2017). Historical case studies also help illustrate the possibility of radical or 
rapid transformation; and raise questions about the received wisdom regarding past 
successes/failures of socio-technical transitions, policies and technologies. The value of 
historical case studies as analogues lies not in their perfect fit with modern technologies or 
circumstances (which is unlikely), but in being similar in one or more aspects and yielding 
insights from the analysis of such similarities and differences. 
The historical studies have shown that rapid change is possible, but not necessarily frequent. It 
may require both a recognition of the need to change, openness to experiment, and a high 
degree of co-ordination (e.g., the natural gas transition). These studies illustrate how co-
constructed are the material or physical aspects with the social, political and institutional 
aspects. For example, the successful 1966-77 conversion from town gas to North Sea natural 
gas (under the management of the nationalised British Gas Corporation) required both 
technical changes, including building the national gas grid and installing new burners in 
millions of gas appliances, along with major institutional reorganisation, new workforce 
training and political support (Arapostathis et al., 2014; Arapostathis et al., 2019). Pearson and 
Arapostathis (2017) explored seven transitions in the UK gas industry since its inception in 
1805. This paper and that of Arapostathis et al. (2019), which focused on the conversion of 
gas-using appliances, questions whether the current UK gas industry is as well situated to adjust 
to the low-carbon transition, particularly the heat transition, as the industry of the 1960s was to 
the transition from town gas to natural gas. They also identify and explore the challenges faced 
by government in helping to steer this transition. 
The subsequent privatisation and liberalisation of the gas market after 1987 led to major 
structural change and a system regulated by Ofgem, with a Uniform Network Code (UNC) 
overseen by the Joint Office of Gas Transporters. Vertical integration was aided by new control 
and communication technologies, together with internationalisation via gas interconnectors. 
That reduced uncertainties, but increased the system's complexity. This case study 
(Arapostathis et al., 2014) provided an analogue for the challenges of integrating large, 
infrastructural technical systems for a sustainability transition. It is inscribed within the MLP 
approach yet concentrates on system integration as a complex and uncertain socio-technical 
process. Consequently, it indicates how quite dramatic changes in the UK natural gas structure 
are mirrored in regime formation (see again Fig. 2). 
Historical studies of two alternatives to petrol in the inter-war period (Johnson et al., 2016) 
show how and why emerging technological substitutes can founder and potential transitions 
fail in times of economic instability, shifting governance and competition between incumbents 
and newcomers. This study compared transition experiences and branching points (i.e., points 
at which key regime actors felt the need to take decisions to stay on or depart from an existing 
pathway) of emerging alternative liquid fuels in Britain during previous recession and growth 
periods between the First and Second World Wars (WWI and WWII), i.e., 1918-1938. The 
case studies focussed on alcohol fuel produced by the Distillers Company Ltd. (DCL) for power 
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generation and a petrol-from-coal produced by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). Both fuels 
received government support during a time of rapid growth in the motor industry, fluctuating 
economic conditions and fears of absolute oil shortages. They represent examples of failed 
attempts at path creation and transition. Nevertheless, the studies identified the importance of 
network infrastructure, ownership of this infrastructure, and the impact of energy security on 
prevailing governance framings or ‘logics’. Thus, Johnson et al. (2016) observed that when 
energy is seen as ‘insecure’, it tends to be framed as a social service (or article of warlike 
material) rather than a commodity, with growing political legitimacy of policy interventions. 
They found that crude oil market instability, support for a declining coal industry, and 
militaristic needs all motivated the search for these alternative liquid fuels in the inter-war 
period. Governance of fuel distribution had significant effects on the economic feasibility of 
both fuels and their ability to penetrate a market dominated by the oil industry incumbents. 
Changing characteristics of energy security influenced the framing of energy and shifts in 
government support for alternative transport fuels. Lack of state regulation of incumbent oil 
company cartels and access to fuel distribution infrastructure impeded emergence of these new 
fuels. This analysis of failed attempts at path creation (Johnson et al., 2016) can therefore 
usefully inform understanding of current energy governance and low carbon transitions. 
 
There is relatively little historical work on demand reduction. However, the recent study of the 
Electricity Development Association (EDA) and domestic electric heating in early post-war 
Britain (Carlsson-Hyslop, 2016; Chilvers et al., 2017) suggests that the electricity industry’s 
attempts at persuading consumers to reduce demand illustrate some of the challenges facing 
demand reduction today. The EDA, originally established as a public relations arm of the UK 
electricity industry, tried simultaneously to reduce undesirable peak demand, whilst 
encouraging increased demand more generally. In the late 1940s it recommended that electric 
fires should not be used to meet peak demand. However, in the 1950s and 1960s the EDA, 
focusing on the growing market for central space heating, concentrated on promoting off-peak 
heating appliances. It first sought to do this in the UK via under-floor heating, and then block 
storage heaters typically composed of clay bricks or other ceramic material. The study 
analysed the way in which the then London County Council (LCC) and its tenants adopted, 
adapted to and in some cases resisted the use of electric underfloor heating. It concluded that 
attempts at promoting demand reduction by the electricity industry during the period 1945-
1964 had only a limited effect on the trend towards rising energy end-use demand. This was, 
in part, due to the EDA’s promotional efforts and conflicting objectives.  
The recent review of historical energy studies by Pearson (2018) noted several problem areas, 
including the distinction between the many kinds of ‘minor’ and ‘major’ (or ‘grand’) 
transitions. He observed that the ability of historians to draw such distinctions with confidence 
has implications for their - and our - capacity to comprehend the scale, pace, duration, 
smoothness and (dis)continuity or other ‘special’ properties of particular transitions. Such 
comprehension is however limited, as is its ability to offer insights into how to guide or manage 
them. Pearson (2018) argued, nevertheless, that historical analyses can offer insights into past 
energy transitions that are of value to non-historians who study past, current and prospective 
energy transitions and, where appropriate, to policy-makers who seek to grapple with them. He 
also noted the ambiguity, even contradiction in the literature, and suggested that greater clarity 
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would be valuable (Pearson, 2018). Finally, he extended an invitation to interested historians 
to further share the methods, subtleties and findings of historical analysis with non-historians, 
to enhance our knowledge, understanding and thinking about energy transitions. 
 
4.     The Low Carbon, More Electric UK Transition Pathways  
4.1  Visions of Low Carbon, More Electric UK Futures 
Several studies have been undertaken in recent years that yield low or zero carbon energy 
scenario sets for the UK [see, for example, the three UK pathway/scenario sets discussed by 
Allen and Hammond (2019)]. The focus of the present study is on the three pathways developed 
by the Transition Pathways Consortium (see Section 1.3). It consisted of UK engineers, social 
scientists, policy analysts, and innovation specialists (and included the present authors). As 
noted, this Consortium sought to develop and explore ‘transition pathways’ towards a UK low 
carbon electricity system (Foxon et al., 2010; Chilvers et al., 2017), to understand the changing 
roles of large and small actors in the dynamics of these transitions, and to learn from the 
successes and failures of past transitions. The research team have focused on the choices and 
actions needed to “get there from here”, and on the analysis of technical, socio-economic and 
environmental implications of the pathways (Foxon, 2013; Foxon et al., 2010; Hammond et 
al., 2013; Hammond and O’Grady, 2014; Chilvers et al., 2017; Hammond et al., 2013; 
Hammond et al., 2019). An innovative, arguably robust, and ‘whole systems’ evidence base 
was developed that is distinctive from those devised elsewhere in the UK energy research 
community in its focus on governance ‘logics’ and structures. The pathways are not predictions 
or roadmaps; rather they are a way of imaginatively exploring future possibilities, including 
different approaches to governance, to inform proactive and protective decision-making and 
enhance the potential for building consensus towards common goals (Chilvers et al., 2017; 
Hammond and Pearson, 2017). 
An initial set of transition pathways for a UK low carbon energy system were developed by 
applying three main steps (Foxon et al., 2010): (1) characterising the existing energy regime, 
its internal tensions and landscape pressures on it; (2) identifying dynamic processes at the 
niche level [see again Fig. 2 (Foxon et al., 2010)]; and (3) specifying interactions giving rise 
to, or strongly influencing, the transition pathways and potential branching points on them. 
They were devised via stakeholder workshops (involving UK energy researchers, industrialists, 
policy advisers and decision-makers), a narrative descriptive of each pathway, and their 
subsequent technical elaboration (Barton et al., 2018). The stakeholder workshops were 
employed by the consortium to distinguish the ‘governance logics’ of three core sets of actors: 
driven by the market, central government intervention, and local community initiatives. 
Consequently, the three transition pathways were respectively named Market Rules (MR), 
Central Co-ordination (CC) and Thousand Flowers (TF); each being dominated by a single 
group’s logic (Foxon et al., 2010; Hammond and Pearson, 2013; Chilvers et al., 2017; 
Hammond and Pearson, 2017; Barton et al., 2018). Chilvers et al. (2017) and Barton et al. 
(2018) summarise the development and high-level analysis of the v2.1 transition pathways set, 
in order to explain their key features and the distinctiveness and value of the approach, which 
builds inter alia on approaches originally devised by Dutch researchers (e.g., Rip and Kemp, 
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1998; Geels, 2002; Verbong and Geels; 2007). Thus, the consortium applied the MLP for 
analysing socio-technical transitions, based on interactions at and between the three levels 
noted earlier: niche innovations, socio-technical regimes, and macro-landscape pressures (see 
again Fig. 2). 
The development of the UK transition pathways has undergone several iterative loops. Earlier 
energy analysis and environmental LCA by Hammond et al. (2013) related to v1.1 of the 
pathways. However, a second iteration of these pathways was performed in order to investigate 
the limitations of that version in terms of technical feasibility, electric grid enhancement needs, 
social acceptability, energy and environmental performance, and also in the light of the 
outcomes of the stakeholder workshops (Foxon et al., 2010; Chilvers et al., 2017). Based on 
the logics of each of the three pathways, using a bottom-up approach, the change of energy use 
was determined, and the demand by sector was modelled (Barton et al., 2013). The progression 
of the electricity mix required to meet the demand, while adhering to the logic of each given 
pathway, was then projected (Barnacle et al., 2013). v2.1 enabled the pathways to be updated 
in order to incorporate further stakeholder inputs and developments in UK energy policy, as 
well as inputs from additional modelling. This updating also facilitated a revised life-cycle 
energy and carbon accounting of the pathways (Hammond and O’Grady, 2014; 2017a; 2017b) 
with an emphasis on the consequences of upstream emissions from power plants. Subsequently, 
other environmental and resource burdens of the v2.1 transition pathways were evaluated using 
the environmental or ‘ecological’ footprint technique (Hammond et al., 2019). 
 
4.2  Demand and Supply Portfolios for the UK Transition Pathways 
An iterative approach was used to provide quantification of the demand and supply profiles for 
the UK transition pathways to 2050, by iterating between the narrative storylines and 
exploration of the pathways with a range of modelling and analysis tools (Chilvers et al., 2017; 
Barton et al., 2018). Key characteristics of the three transition pathways are summarised in 
Table 1 (Foxon, 2013; Chilvers et al., 2017). The starting point for the quantification of version 
2.1 of these pathways was the projection of annual electricity demand by sector from 2010 to 
2050 (Barton et al., 2013; Barton et al., 2018). In the MR pathway, annual electricity demand 
rises from 337 Tera Watt hours (TWh) in 2010 to about 512 TWh in 2050 (see again Table 1), 
due to increasing use of electricity for industry, commercial, transport and domestic space 
heating and hot water. In contrast, annual electricity demand under the CC pathway rises from 
337 TWh in 2010 to some 410 TWh in 205) (Table 1). This pathway sees electricity demand 
rising and then levelling off from 2030 onwards, due to increasing use of electricity for 
transport and domestic space heating and hot water. However, it suggests higher rates of energy 
efficiency improvements in the domestic sector, and a smaller, highly-efficient industrial sector 
with lower levels of output (Barton et al., 2013; Chilvers et al., 2017). This would imply that 
some energy-intensive UK production has moved to other countries, increasing the national 
consumption of goods produced abroad, implying that UK carbon emissions calculated on a 
consumption basis would continue to diverge from those on a production basis. Finally, under 
the TF pathway (Barton et al., 2013; Barton et al., 2018), the annual electricity demand falls 
from 337 TWh in 2010 to only around 310 TWh in 2050 (Table 1). Despite similar levels of 
electrification of transport to that in the other pathways, electricity demand falls due to even 
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higher rates of energy efficiency improvements in the domestic and commercial sectors. Again, 
a small, highly-efficient industrial sector with low levels of output aids the reduction in 
electricity demand. In all pathways a significant amount of energy is used in industry and 
commerce for space heating and water heating. The provision of this heat is mostly via the 
same technologies as in the domestic sector of each pathway, but often on a larger scale. Thus, 
in the MR and CC pathways, an increasing amount of electricity is used in heat pumps in the 
industrial and commercial sectors (Chilvers et al., 2017; Barton et al., 2018). This increase in 
demand for electricity for heating and hot water is additional to that required for electrification 
of transport, and it leads to a significant rise in total final electricity demand in these pathways. 
However, under the TF pathway, the total final electricity demand remains stable up to 2050, 
as the increase in transport electricity consumption is offset by reductions in demand as a result 
of energy efficiency improvements. Thus, there is no rise in electricity demand for heating and 
hot water under the TF pathway, mainly due to the expansion of community-scale renewable 
combined heat and power (CHP). 
The energy demand requirements under v2.1 of all the pathways (Barton et al., 2018) are met 
by rising levels of low-carbon electricity generation, including different generation capacities 
of renewables, nuclear power and fossil fuels (e.g., coal and, in the future, mainly gas) with 
CCS, operating at different capacity factors. The detailed generation capacity schedule for each 
pathway from 2010 to 2050 is reported by Barnacle et al. (2013) and Barton et al. (2013): see 
Figures 3-5 (corresponding demand projections were presented graphically by Barton et al., 
2018). In 2010, the UK had around 95 Giga Watts (GW) of electricity generation capacity, 
including 29 GW of coal and dual-fuel generation, 33 GW of gas-fired generation, 11 GW of 
nuclear power, 9 GW of renewable generation and 6 GW of combined heat and power (CHP) 
cogeneration (Barnacle et al., 2013; Barton et al., 2013). Significant amounts of capacity are 
then required to come on stream under the MR pathway in the 2020s (Chilvers et al., 2017; 
Barton et al., 2018): see Fig. 3. Subsequently, 21 GW of fossil-fuelled with CCS, 15 GW of 
nuclear power and 47 GW of renewables (47 GW) by 2030; giving a total capacity of around 
130 GW by 2030 (Barnacle et al., 2013; Barton et al., 2013). This deployment leads to further 
increases in capacity in order to meet rising electricity demand over following decades, 
particularly from industry and electrification of heating and transport (Chilvers et al., 2017; 
Barton et al., 2018). Thus, a total of some 168 GW of capacity is installed by 2050, including 
44 GW of fossil-fuelled generation with CCS, 26 GW of nuclear power, and 80 GW of 
renewable capacity, principally from onshore (23 GW) and offshore (30 GW) wind turbines, 
tidal power (12 GW) and renewable CHP (9 GW).  
Similar investments occur in all types of low-carbon generation capacity under the CC pathway 
during the 2020s (Chilvers et al., 2017; Barton et al., 2018): see Fig. 4; perhaps co-ordinated 
by a Strategic Energy Agency. This could lead to a total of some 122 GW in 2030 (Barnacle et 
al., 2013; Barton et al., 2013), including high levels of nuclear power (22 GW), slightly lower 
levels of fossil-fuelled power generation with CCS (18 GW), and less renewables (43 GW). 
Electricity demand levels off under this pathway, but further power plant deployment would 
be required in order to increase the capacity to about 151 GW in total by 2050 (Chilvers et al., 
2017; Barton et al., 2018). The main contributions are likely to come from nuclear power (30 
GW) and fossil-fuelled power generation with CCS (30 GW), although the latter operates at a 
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lower capacity factor (36%), because it again partly provides a back-up for intermittent 
renewables (65 GW). Finally, action by community groups, as well as local and regional 
Energy Service Companies (ESCos), under the TF pathway, result in a significant expansion 
of community-based and micro-scale renewable CHP installed from 2020 onwards (Chilvers 
et al., 2017; Barton et al., 2018). This reaches a total capacity of 37 GW by 2030 and about 
149 GW by 2050 (Barnacle et al., 2013; Barton et al., 2013): see Fig. 5. This is at a similar 
level to that under the CC pathway, although most plant is made up of renewable generation 
(112 GW). A significant proportion of demand under the TF pathway is met by local-scale 
renewables (Chilvers et al., 2017; Barton et al., 2018); from renewable (biogas) community-
scale and micro-CHP systems (44 GW), followed by onshore wind turbines (21 GW), solar 
photovoltaic (PV) arrays (16 GW), and offshore wind farms (8 GW). There are also likely to 
be some low-carbon investments in earlier periods; possibly leading to 22 GW of fossil-fuelled 
power plant with CCS and 5 GW of nuclear capacity by 2050. 
 
Fig. 3. Generation capacity in the Market Rules pathway for the UK.  
                 [Source: Barton et al., 2018; updated from Barnacle et al., 2013.] 
 
5.      Concluding Remarks 
A large interdisciplinary consortium of engineers, social scientists and policy analysts have 
developed three low carbon, more electric transition pathways for the United Kingdom (UK): 
described as ‘Market Rules’ (MR), ‘Central Co-ordination’ (CC) and ‘Thousand Flowers’ (TF) 
respectively. The study builds on an approach based on earlier work on understanding 
transitions, using a multi-level perspective with landscape, regime and niche levels, and its 
application to the development of ‘socio-technical scenarios’. These pathways to 2050 focus 
on the power sector, including the potential for increasing use of low-carbon electricity for 
heating and transport. Here (in Part 1) studies of historical energy and infrastructure transitions 
have helped understand the dynamics and timing of past transitions, as well as the contexts and 
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conditions that influenced them. Pearson (2018) recently argued that historical analyses offer 
insights into past energy transitions that are of value to non-historians who study past, current 
and prospective energy transitions and, where appropriate, to policy-makers who seek to 
grapple with them. 
 
Fig. 4. Generation capacity in the Central Co-ordination pathway for the UK.  
 [Source: Barton et al., 2018; updated from Barnacle et al., 2013.] 
 
The extent to which choices need to be made by UK energy policymakers and stakeholders 
between the large-scale and small-scale actors, pathways and associated technologies are 
discussed (Foxon, 2013; Hammond and Pearson, 2017). Here (again in Part 1 of this 
contribution) the present UK transition pathways are used to highlight the fact that significantly 
different technological pathways to a low carbon electricity system in the UK by 2050 are 
possible, although any of these pathways will be challenging to realise. They imply differing 
levels of efforts and different patterns of risks and uncertainties and approaches to the system’s 
governance. Each exhibits challenges in relation to energy efficiency and behavioural changes, 
as well as technology choices and their rate of deployment (Barton et al., 2018). The way in 
which these are addressed and resolved will depend on the governance arrangements of the low 
carbon transition, including policy measures and regulatory frameworks. So the roles and 
choices of market, government, and civil society actors are crucial to realising any of these 
pathways (Chilvers et al., 2017). In a companion paper (Part 2) horizon scanning and energy 
technology assessments (ETAs) of the energy technologies that influence the three UK 
transition pathways are employed to provide an understanding the future interplay of the 
energy policy trilemma, i.e., achieving deep GHG emission cuts, whilst maintaining a secure 
and affordable energy system, and addressing how resulting tensions might be resolved. 
Indicative ETAs are used to identify the components of a balance sheet of technological credits 
and debits in order to evaluate their societal impacts, and to determine whether they are 
compatible with Britain's move towards a low carbon future in 2050 and beyond. All three 
pathways (MR, CC and TF) are evaluated in terms of their environmental performance using 
complementary life cycle assessment (LCA) and footprinting methods. The energy analysis 
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and environmental LCAs reported by Hammond et al. (2013) and Hammond and O’Grady 
(2014; 2017a; 2017b), evaluated v1.1 and v2.1 of the pathways respectively. Environmental 
footprint analysis (EFA) are also employed to estimate the environmental and resource burdens 
associated with UK power generation based on historic data and the three transition pathways 
(Hammond et al., 2019). So-called ‘disruptive’ technological options are examined in order to 
provide recommendations on the framing of future energy policy choices that limit the 
environmental consequences of future electricity systems. It is argued that the value of any new 
policy direction must be evaluated not only against medium-term climate change (or GHG 
emission) goals, but against long-term, system-wide goals over a wider spectrum of 
environmental metrics. 
 
Fig. 5. Generation capacity in the Thousand Flowers pathway for the UK.  
         [Source: Barton et al., 2018; updated from Barnacle et al., 2013.] 
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